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1. Introduction
In Opinion 1/94, the Court of Justice could be said to have had “mixed
feelings” about the hitherto widely interpreted scope of the Common
Commercial Policy (CCP). Following the historic breakthrough of the “Blair
House Accord” between the EU and the United States, the way was paved in
the early 1990s for the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, crowned
by the establishment of the WTO. For the nature and scope of the CCP,
however, this watershed in global economic governance came at a price. In
Opinion 1/94, the ECJ concluded that the EU did not have the requisite power
to conclude the new agreements that accompanied the founding of the WTO
addressing trade in services (GATS) and trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights (TRIPs) on its own, but also needed the Member States
alongside it.1 Hence, these agreements were concluded as so-called “mixed
agreements”, i.e. having both the Union and the Member States as their
parties.
This marked a break with a string of case law in which the CCP had been
interpreted as covering a wide range of issues under the Union’s exclusive
competence,2 which could be seen as a judicial endorsement of the EU as a
“power in trade and through trade”.3 With two recent Grand Chamber
judgments confirming changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty regarding
the scope of EU trade policy, this trend seems to be reversed again. InDaiichi
1. Opinion 1/94, WTO, EU:C:1994:384.
2. See Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011), pp. 11–25.
3. Meunier and Nicolaïdis, “The European Union as a trade power” in Hill and Smith (Eds.),
International Relations and the European Union, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011), p. 277.
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Sankyo and Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), the
Court exhibited no “mixed feelings” as to what the post-Lisbon CCP
encompasses, i.e., the entire TRIPs and most of the GATS.
Beyond the immediately visible significance of these judgments as
endorsing the wide scope of the post-Lisbon CCP, they raise another
fundamental question: to what extent does this qualify the continued necessity
to have the Member States present in the international economic governance
arena? While these judgments may not signify the “end of mixity” – at any rate
outside of the trade realm – do these two judgments represent the beginning of
the end of a transitional period started by Opinion 1/94, cementing a new
chapter in the history of the CCP?
Hence, while both cases raise a number of salient issues relevant for EU
law,4 the analysis presented here will assess the two cases through this lens,
which is important in both political and constitutional terms. Politically, these
judgments impact on the necessity of “mixity” in a range of trade-related
contexts,5 including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) with the United States and the Comprehensive Trade and Economic
Agreement (CETA) with Canada. Constitutionally, they have implications for
the continued presence of the Member States on the international stage
alongside the Union.
2. Background
In terms of factual backgrounds as well the legal remedies sought, the two
cases under discussion are rather different. Daiichi Sankyo was a preliminary
reference in a dispute regarding intellectual property rights before a Greek
court (the Polimeles Protodikio Athinon). The litigants in this case were three
pharmaceutical companies. The patent holder Daiichi Sankyo, a global
pharmaceutical company headquartered in Japan, and its licensee and
4. For a focus on the patent law aspect of Daiichi Sankyo, see Vatsov, “The complicated
simplicity of the DEMO case: side effects of developments in the law – Daiichi Sankyo and
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland v. DEMO (C-414/11)”, 36 European Intellectual Property Review
(2014), 202–206; and Dimopoulos and Vantsiouri, “Of TRIPS and Traps: The interpretative
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union over patent law”, 39 EL Rev. (2014),
210–233.
5. See Gstöhl and Hanf, “The EU’s post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements: Commercial
interests in a changing constitutional context”, 20 ELJ (2014), 739, who note that the EU’s
“‘new generation’ FTAs, which cover not only trade in industrial goods, but also areas such as
agriculture, non-tariff barriers to trade, services, public procurement, investment, intellectual
property rights or competition policy and may establish a dispute settlement mechanism, are
normally mixed agreements.”
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distributor Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH sought to prevent DEMO
Anonimos, a Greek pharmaceutical manufacturer, from selling the latter’s
generic medicinal products, which include an active ingredient by the name of
levofloxacin hemihydrate. For the latter, Daiichi Sankyo claims patent
protection by virtue of a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) in
Greece.6 The dispute raises legal questions as to the interpretation of certain
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement and, moreover, as to the proper judicial
forum for providing such an interpretation, i.e., the Member State court or the
ECJ. The second question depends on whether this part of TRIPs has come to
be covered by the CCP or is still part of an area in which the Member States
retain “primary competence”,7 including the power to “accord direct effect” to
these provisions in their national legal order.8
Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention) concerned an
action for annulment of the Council Decision on the signing on behalf of the
European Union of an international agreement, viz. the European Convention
on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional
access (hereinafter: Conditional Access Convention).9 This convention was
elaborated in the framework of the Council of Europe, was formally adopted
in January 2001 and entered into force two and a half years later.10 The aim of
the Convention is to combat, including through criminalization, the “illicit
reception of encrypted services”11 through the use of “illicit devices”,12 acts
commonly known as “piracy” of for-pay television, radio or Internet content.
Before the contested decision was adopted, the Convention had been signed
by a total of twelve countries and ratified by nine.13 At that time, five Member
States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, the Netherlands, and Romania) and Croatia
(an EU Member State since 1 July 2013) were party to the Convention, while
Finland ratified it in May 2013.14 The EU’s accession to the Convention,
6. Daiichi Sankyo, paras. 23–28.
7. Ibid., para 31.
8. Ibid., para 32.
9. Council Decision 2011/853/EU of 29 Nov. 2011 on the signing, on behalf of the Union,
of the European Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of,
conditional access, O.J. 2011, L 336/1.
10. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), paras. 8–9.
11. Explanatory Report on the Convention, para 10, as quoted in Commission v. Council
(Conditional Access Convention), para 10.
12. Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional
access, Art. 4(2), as quoted in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention),
para 12.
13. See the page on the status of the Conditional Access Convention of the website of the
Council of Europe Treaty Office <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT
=178&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> (last visited 30 Nov. 2014).
14. Ibid.
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which contains rules similar to internal EU legislation, notably Directive
98/84/EC on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of,
conditional access,15 in force since 1998, was seen as desirable from the
Commission’s point of view, as it “may help give new impetus to ratification
by other countries and thus extend the protection of relevant service providers
outside the EU.”16 However, when it came to identifying the proper legal basis
for the Union instrument for joining the Convention, this turned into an
inter-institutional legal basis dispute, pitting the Commission against the
Council. The Commission had proposed using the CCP (Art. 207(4) TFEU) to
this end.17 The Decision eventually adopted by the Council, by contrast, uses
Article 114 TFEU on the approximation of laws between the Member States
as the legal basis.
3. Judgments and Opinions
3.1. Daiichi Sankyo
In the judgment, after quickly striking down an objection to admissibility by
DEMO on the grounds of the action being devoid of purpose, the ECJ turned
to answering the three preliminary questions. The first one concerned the
question of competence and thus scope of the CCP. While the parties and
intervening governments referred in their arguments to the existing body of
case law on mixed agreements,18 the Commission relied mainly on a textual
argument, more particularly the wording of Article 207(1) TFEU. Following
the Lisbon reform, this provision now explicitly includes “commercial aspects
of intellectual property” as part of the CCP, and therefore qualified the
relevance of earlier case law in the Commission’s view.19 Instead, according
to the Commission, the TRIPs Agreement, relating “as a whole”20 to
15. Directive 98/84/EC on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of,
conditional access, O.J. 1998, L 320/54.
16. Commission, Second report on the implementation of Directive 98/84, Brussels, 30
Sept. 2008 COM(2008)593 final, p. 7.
17. Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the signing of the European
Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access,
Brussels, 15 Dec. 2010 COM(2010)753 final.
18. Daiichi Sankyo, para 42. These parties refer in particular to Joined Cases C-300 &
392/98, Dior and Others, EU:C:2000:688; Case C-431/05,Merck Genéricos, EU:C:2007:496
(regarding the TRIPs agreement as falling in an area of shared competence); and Case
C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, EU:C:2011:125 (regarding competence delimitation
in mixed agreements).
19. Daiichi Sankyo, para 43.
20. Ibid., para 43.
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“commercial aspects of intellectual property”, consequently falls fully within
the CCP. Disagreeing with that position, the intervening governments argued
that by contrast “the majority of the rules in the TRIPs Agreement”,21
including Article 27 on patentability, the interpretation of which was at issue
here, relate only indirectly to international trade, and thus continue to fall
under the shared competence of the internal market.
The Court noted that the current Article 207(1) on the scope of the CCP
“differs significantly from the provisions it essentially replaced”,22 which
were Article 133(1), 133(5)(1), 133(6)(2) and 133(7) EC; and before that,
Article 113 EEC, which did not mention “commercial aspects of intellectual
property” at all. Hence, given this “significant development of primary
law”,23 the Court took a fresh look at the question of the division of
competences between the Union and its Member States. Consequently,
hitherto defining decisions such as Opinion 1/94 and Merck Genéricos were
no longer considered “material”24 by the Court in order to determine the scope
of the CCP.
Turning to the concept of “commercial aspects of intellectual property”, the
Court noted that Union acts, including the conclusion of international
agreements, need to have more than mere “implications for international
trade” to be covered by the CCP.25 Instead, and recalling the pre-existing body
of case law on legal basis determination (also known as the “centre of gravity”
test) as regards the CCP, “a European Union act falls within the Common
Commercial Policy if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is
essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and
immediate effects on trade”.26 Consequently, “of the rules adopted by the
European Union in the field of intellectual property, only those with a specific
link to international trade are capable of falling within the concept of
‘commercial aspects of intellectual property’ in Article 207(1) TFEU and
hence the field of the Common Commercial Policy.”27 Subsequently, the
Court declared that this “is the case” as regards the rules contained in the
TRIPs Agreement, as they all appear to have such a “specific link with
international trade”.28 To illustrate this conclusion, the Court referred to the
21. Ibid., para 44.
22. Ibid., para 46.
23. Ibid., para 48.
24. Ibid., para 48.
25. Ibid., para 51.
26. Ibid., para 51, referring to Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, EU:C:2001:664; Case
C-347/03, Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia and ERSA, EU:C:2005:285; and Case
C-411/06, Commission v. Parliament and Council (Waste Shipments), EU:C:2009:518.
27. Daiichi Sankyo, para 52.
28. Ibid., para 53.
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fact that under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding,
cross-suspension of concessions are allowed, which applies also fully to
TRIPs.29
In response to the arguments of some of the intervening governments
contesting the link with international trade, in particular as regards Part II of
the TRIPs containing Article 27, the Court stressed that their line of reasoning
fails to take proper account of the objective of the TRIPs Agreement. This
objective, the ECJ recalled, is “to strengthen and harmonize the protection of
intellectual property on a worldwide scale”,30 which entails furthermore
“effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights” so as to
“reduce distortions of international trade”.31 Part II, according to the Court,
“contributes to attaining that objective by setting out, for each of the principal
categories of intellectual property rights, rules which must be applied by
every member of the WTO.”32
While “it remains altogether open to the European Union” to legislate on
intellectual property rights as part of the rules on the internal market, the Court
stressed that “acts adopted on that basis and intended to have validity
specifically for the European Union will have to comply with the rules
concerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights in the
TRIPs Agreement, as those rules are still, as previously, intended to
standardize certain rules on the subject at world level and thereby to facilitate
international trade.”33 Agreeing with the Commission, the Court determined
that “the rules on patentable subject-matter in Article 27 of the TRIPs
Agreement” fall within the CCP, and that this is nothing other than a reflection
of “the fact that the context of those rules is the liberalization of international
trade, not the harmonization of the laws of the Member States of the European
Union.”34
Having concluded that Article 27 TRIPs (and in fact, TRIPs at large) now
falls under the CCP, the Court saw no need to answer the second part of the
first question referred to it, i.e., whether it is for national courts to decide
whether to give it direct effect.35 The implied answer here, though, would be
that they could not do so any more.
The Court then turned to the two other questions posed by the referring
court, which concern the interpretation of the TRIPs provisions in question:
29. Ibid., para 54.
30. Ibid., para 58; referring back to Case C-89/99, Schieving-Nijstad and Others,
EU:C:2001:438, para 36.
31. Daiichi Sankyo, para 58.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., para 59.
34. Ibid., para 60.
35. Ibid., para 61.
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firstly, on the patentability, as well as the scope of protection by virtue of such
a patent, of chemical and pharmaceutical products under Article 27 TRIPs;
and secondly, on whether Article 27 combined with the transitional provisions
contained in Article 70 TRIPs entails protection of both the process of
manufacture as well as of the pharmaceutical product as such in the specific
context of this case, in which the initial patent granted under Greek law only
covered the process, not the product, even though both had been applied for.
Regarding the first question, the Court answered in the affirmative, siding
with Daiichi Sankyo, the Commission and the governments that submitted
written observations. According to the ECJ, Article 27 TRIPs allows for the
patentability of pharmaceutical products, certain specific exclusions provided
for in the TRIPs notwithstanding, and provided that no derogation to these
exceptions is applicable.36 As to the scope of protection this entails, the Court
noted that this issue is addressed elsewhere in the TRIPs. Since it considered
the order of reference requesting an interpretation of these provisions as useful
for the resolution of the dispute, the Court refrained from elaborating on the
second part of this question.37
Regarding the final question referred to the Court, which concerns the
extension of protection originally granted only to the process of manufacture
to the product by virtue of TRIPs provisions, the Court answered in the
negative, siding with DEMO and the Commission. The intervening
governments were divided over this question.38 Based on the information
received, the Court found that the scope of the patent protection remained
limited to the process in the particular context of the case.39
The Court’s ruling in Daiichi Sankyo departed markedly from the
conclusions drawn by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his Opinion as
regards the scope of the CCP. Highlighting at the outset his awareness “of the
extraordinary interpretative difficulty”40 the case entails, the Advocate
General sought to find a middle ground between the Commission’s emphasis
on the new language of Article 207(1) TFEU and the Member States’
insistence on the wide scope of the TRIPs to the effect of exceeding mere
“commercial aspects” and hence also covering matters which continue to fall
into a shared competence area. For the Advocate General, “the Member States
and the Commission are both correct”.41 In providing a concise summary, it is
36. Ibid., paras 64–68.
37. Ibid., para 69.
38. Ibid., para 71.
39. Ibid., para 78.
40. Opinion in Daiichi Sankyo, EU:C:2013:49, para 5.
41. Ibid., para 55.
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difficult to do justice to the inner dialectics of the Advocate General’s
Opinion and the ensuing narrated struggle between, on the one hand,
the “functional”42 and, on the other, the “‘topographic’ or even
‘compartmentalized’ interpretation of the wording of Article 207(1)
TFEU”,43 resulting in what appears to be “an irreconcilable contradiction”.44
Instead of the clear-cut, and arguably much more accessible, conclusion the
Court drew in its decision, the Advocate General proposed a more nuanced
way to resolve this contradiction based on “the respective consequences, in
terms of effectiveness in each case, which arise when opting for either of the
opposing approaches”, with a view to providing “the best possible
interpretation of the legislative provisions on which each of those approaches
is based”.45 Following what has been aptly described as a “a very complex and
cautiously inwardly oriented approach”,46 the Advocate General concluded
that, “as European Union law now stands, Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement
does not regulate subject-matter which falls within the commercial aspects of
intellectual property within the meaning of Article 207(1) TFEU”.47
Consequently, regarding the power to interpret these provisions, “the case law
of the Court which links the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret
provisions set out in international treaties to the substantive competence for
the subject-matter in question continues to be valid.”48
The remainder of the Advocate General’s Opinion could be described as an
attempt at damage control, should the Court, as it eventually would, choose
not to follow the Advocate General regarding the first question. In particular,
theAdvocate General focused on the question of direct effect, which the Court
did not address explicitly, restating earlier case law that militates in favour of
a general rule excluding direct effect of provisions of the WTO agreements.49
Applying this to Articles 27 and 70 TRIPs, he argued against its direct effect
in EU law,50 noting also the very divided national judicial approaches within
the Member States to this question.51
Regarding the other questions relating to the patentability and scope of
protection of the pharmaceutical product in question, the Advocate General
42. Ibid., para 69.
43. Ibid., para 68.
44. Ibid., para 70.
45. Ibid., para 72.
46. Ankersmit, “The scope of the Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: The Daiichi
Sankyo and Conditional Access Services Grand Chamber Judgments”, 41 LIEI (2014), 198.
47. Opinion in Daiichi Sankyo, para 81.
48. Ibid., para 81.
49. Ibid., para 86; referring to Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72, International Fruit Company
and Others, EU:C:1972:115.
50. Opinion in Daiichi Sankyo, paras. 83–89 and 104.
51. Ibid., paras. 90–99.
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concludes that the TRIPs provisions at issue do not grant what he called an
“‘automatic extension’of a patent on a process to a patent on a pharmaceutical
product claimed by Daiichi Sankyo.”52
Before closing, the Advocate General cautioned to limit the temporal
effects of a ruling of the Court against his recommendation for the sake of
legal certainty in view of “the diversity and enormous quantity of litigation,
largely resolved”,53 in this area. Hence, he recommended that the Court’s
decision “should apply only from the date of publication of the judgment”.54
The Court did not respond to this request in its judgment.
3.2. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention)
The Court’s judgment in Commission v. Council regarding the proper legal
basis of the Conditional Access Convention, delivered three months after
Daiichi Sankyo, equally found in favour of an expanded scope of the CCP
post-Lisbon, but this time in the area of services, and outside the WTO
context. In the judgment, the Court decided to annul the contested decision for
want of the correct legal basis, which should have been Article 207(4) TFEU,
i.e., agreements concluded within the framework of the CCP.
As to the main arguments of the parties, the Commission, supported by the
European Parliament, argued that the CCP represents the correct legal basis
given that the primary aim of the Convention is, firstly, “to ensure adequate
protection of the services concerned on the markets of those contracting
parties which do not belong to the European Union in order to facilitate and
promote the supply of those services by EU service providers in those markets
under viable economic conditions.”55 Approximation of laws (Art. 114
TFEU), the legal basis chosen by the Council, was not an aim in itself but
merely a means for achieving this overall objective.56 Secondly, according to
the Commission, “the Convention is primarily concerned with the supply of
conditional access services between the European Union and other European
countries” with a view to “extending to those other countries the protection
against acts of piracy introduced by” existing EU legislation.57 Thirdly, the
Convention “is directly aimed at eliminating obstacles to the trade in protected
services by prohibiting all commercial activity which makes ‘hacking’ or
52. Ibid., para 113.
53. Ibid., para 121.
54. Ibid., para 121.
55. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 37.
56. Ibid., para 38.
57. Ibid., para 42.
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other forms of electronic piracy possible”,58 thus having a direct and
immediate effect in terms of trade promotion and facilitation.
The Council, supported by a number of Member States, defended its
decision choosing Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis with the following
main arguments. According to them, the Convention “intended to
approximate the legislation of the contracting parties, including the legislation
of the Member States of the European Union”,59 and hence regarded such
harmonization as an end in itself rather than a vehicle for trade-related
objectives.60 The Council also argued that the fact that the Convention covered
supply of the services in question between the EU and third countries “in no
way means that it is intended to apply more to those services than to those
supplied within the European Union”,61 its effects on external trade in services
being only “indirect and secondary”.62
After noting that the other legal basis mentioned in the contested decision,
Article 218(5) TFEU on international agreements concluded by the Union,
was not contested by the parties,63 the Court started by recalling its settled case
law on the choice of the correct legal basis in EU law, i.e., that such a choice
“must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial review”, including
“the aim and content of that measure”.64 This case law also provides that in
case of a multi-purposes measure, the predominant purpose determines the
legal basis.65
Quoting the Daiichi Sankyo judgment, the Court reiterated that “an EU act
falls within [the CCP] if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is
essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and
immediate effects on trade”.66 Having noted the similarity between the
Convention and pre-existing internal EU legislation, and referring to the
Explanatory Report on the Convention and the explanatory memorandum
accompanying the proposal for the contested decision, the Court concluded
that signing the Convention “is thus supposed to help extend the application of
provisions similar to those of Directive 98/84 beyond the borders of the
European Union and to establish a law on conditional access services which is
58. Ibid., para 43.
59. Ibid., para 45.
60. Ibid., para 47.
61. Ibid., para 49.
62. Ibid., para 50.
63. Ibid., para 51.
64. Ibid., para 52; referring in particular to Case C-411/06, Commission v. Parliament and
Council (Waste Shipments); and Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:472.
65. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 53.
66. Ibid., para 57, referring toDaiichi Sankyo, para 51, and pointing to the further case law
noted there.
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applicable throughout the European continent”.67 Hence, the Court saw a
direct link to international trade and thus the CCP as the primary objective of
the decision.68
Responding to the arguments of the Council and Member States relying on
the part of the Convention that explicitly addresses approximation of
legislation, the Court pointed to the disconnection clause in Article 11(4) of
the Convention, according to which the Member States are to continue to
apply EU rules in this field, and which have already materialized in the form
of Directive 98/84. Consequently, the added value, if you will, of the
Convention resides for the ECJ not in improving “the functioning of the
internal market, but to extend legal protection of the relevant services beyond
the territory of the European Union and thereby to promote international trade
in those services”.69 Moreover, contrary to the Council’s position, the ban on
exports of illicit devices to the EU was seen by the Court not as a measure
solely aimed at defending the internal market, but rather “concerns the
defence of the European Union’s global interests and falls, by its very nature,
within the ambit of the Common Commercial Policy”.70 Other parts of the
Convention, such as those on seizures and confiscations, which can take the
form of criminal law measures, were seen by the Court as being “purely
incidental to the primary objective of the contested decision.”71
The Court also dismissed arguments raised by the Council during the
hearing based on Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and
Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice and Protocol No.
22 on the position of Denmark annexed to the EU Treaties. The Court
emphasized that these cannot have “any effect whatsoever on the question of
the correct legal basis”.72
The ECJ concluded that in view of the act’s primary objective having “a
specific connection to the Common Commercial Policy”,73 Article 207(4)
TFEU, together with the uncontested Article 218(5) TFEU, would have been
the correct legal basis. The Court noted that “the signing of the Convention on
behalf of the European Union falls within the exclusive competence of the
European Union, pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) TFEU.”74 Before pronouncing
67. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 63.
68. Ibid., para 65.
69. Ibid., para 67.
70. Ibid., para 69, referring back to Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard), EU:C:1975:145;
Opinion 1/94, WTO; and Case C-94/03, Commission v. Council, (Rotterdam Convention)
[2006] ECR I-1.
71. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 71.
72. Ibid., para 73.
73. Ibid., para 76.
74. Ibid., para 76.
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the annulment of the contested decision, the Court noted that it would
maintain the latter’s effects until the adoption of a new decision using the
correct legal basis in order to avoid uncertainty as to the Union’s signature of
the Convention.75
Unlike Daiichi Sankyo, the Court in this case followed the
recommendations of the Advocate General. Advocate General Kokott
emphasized in her Opinion the inappropriateness of the use of Article 114
TFEU in the area of EU external action, given that the “provision contributes
to the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26 TFEU and thus has
the aim of establishing and ensuring the functioning of the internal market”
and is hence “intended to allow action by the Parliament and the Council
within the Union”.76 As to the actual primary purpose of the Convention, she
considered its emphasis to be “less on establishing uniform rules in the
European internal market than on attempting ‘to export’ the Union’s internal
acquis to third countries”,77 i.e., as “a contribution to ‘external harmonization’
in relation to third countries”.78 As regards the implications this would have
for the internal market, the Advocate General described them as mere
“knock-on effects of the Convention”.79
Instead, she regarded the CCP as the proper legal basis, being quite capable
of covering such “external harmonization”, seeing that the “object of many
modern trade agreements is precisely this kind of harmonization: those
agreements provide for the creation of uniform legal standards – if appropriate
in the form of minimum standards – for certain products, activities or sectors
with a view to facilitating cross-border trade.”80
Contrary to the Court, the Advocate General also addressed the
Commission’s second plea in law, i.e., the infringement of the Union’s
exclusive competence due to the Council regarding this Convention as a mixed
agreement.81 In addition to detecting such an infringement due to the Union’s
exclusive competence in the CCP (Art. 3(1)(e) TFEU), she also made an
alternative, ERTA-type argument based on Article 3(2) TFEU, i.e. exclusive
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement “in so far as its
conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope”. This led to a
75. Ibid., paras. 78–81.
76. Opinion in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), EU:C:2013:441,
para 43.
77. Ibid., para 49.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., para 58.
80. Ibid., para 67.
81. Ibid., para 93, referring to the wording of Recital 6 in the preamble to the contested
decision, according to which the Union would have no external competence covering Arts. 6
and 8 of the Convention on seizure and confiscation.
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reflection on the ERTA doctrine and the case law defining it in view of the new
Article 3(2) TFEU introduced by the Lisbon reform.82 According to the
Advocate General, this represents a codification of the doctrine, and hence
“interpretation and application of the third variant of Article 3(2) TFEU
should have regard to previous case law”,83 in particular those cases ruling that
the Union had gained exclusive competence in areas that are “already covered
to a large extent by Community [sic] rules.”84 In view of Directive 98/84, the
Advocate General deemed this to be the case, concluding that also from this
alternative perspective, the Union would enjoy exclusive competence.85
4. Analysis
The two Grand Chamber judgments are relevant for several dimensions of EU
law, including the internal market, approximation of laws, patent law,
audiovisual services and judicial cooperation, and of course the Common
Commercial Policy. The meta-issue, certainly from the point of view of EU
constitutional and external relations law, is how they affect the relationship
between the Union and the Member States on the international (economic)
stage. This clear turn in the case law of the ECJ, in the wake of the Lisbon
reform and diverting from Opinion 1/94, will tip the balance in favour of the
EU, with the Commission as its designated trade representative. Beyond
constitutional considerations, this is also highly salient from a policy
perspective, seeing that the question of “mixity” is still unresolved in
high-profile trade agreements in the making (above all TTIP and CETA).
4.1. A more comprehensive trade policy: Clarity over caution
The two decisions, together with the pre-Lisbon Opinion 1/08, which already
established that trade in services was now fully part of the CCP (except for
transport),86 contrast starkly with the string of case law starting with Opinion
1/94 on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round agreements. This puts in
question the future relevance of what until now were defining judgments in
82. Opinion in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 112;
referring to Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), EU:C:1971:32 and Opinion 1/03,
Lugano Convention, EU:C:2006:81.
83. Opinion in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 113.
84. Ibid., para 113; referring earlier (at para 110) to Opinion 2/91, ILO, EU:C:1993:106;
Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark (Open Skies), EU:C:2002:625; and Opinion 1/03,
Lugano Convention.
85. Opinion in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 123.
86. Opinion 1/08,GATS, EU:C:2009:739.
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this area,87 including also Hermès,88 Dior89 and Merck Genéricos.90 Giving
full effect to the textual changes brought about by the Lisbon reform, and by
applying the scope of the CCP more broadly and in a more clear-cut manner,
the decisions annotated here can also be seen as linking back to the Court’s
earlier case law before the advent of the WTO.91
In doing so, the Court chose clarity over caution, and Treaty reform over
path dependency. This is particularly true forDaiichi Sankyo, if one compares
the back-and-forth of the Advocate General’s Opinion with the
straightforward answer provided by the Court. The scope of the CCP has been
widened to include “commercial aspects of intellectual property rights” – an
unequivocal pronouncement that can appear sweeping only in a historical, if
not nostalgic, sense. This could not have blindsided the Member States
altogether, as the Court rightly points to their capacity as “Masters of the
Treaties”. Hence, being “the authors of the FEU Treaty”, they “could not have
been unaware that the terms thus used in that provision correspond almost
literally to the very title of the TRIPs Agreement.”92
In theConditionalAccess Convention case, the Court also points straight to
what it considers to be the main rationale behind the Convention, which
signals early on how it will conclude the judgment. Based on the Convention’s
wording and accompanying documents, such as the explanatory report which
sets out the EU’s perspective, the ECJ considers the Convention to be
principally aimed at extending norms already present in the EU to the outside
world, as a form of what Advocate General Kokott aptly calls “external
harmonization”.93 It is a measure aimed at “the harmonious development of
world trade”,94 and more generally pursuing “the development of
international law”.95 What it is not about, and cannot be about due to this same
pre-existing EU legislation and the disconnection clause, is introducing new
rules within the EU.
Regarding Advocate General Cruz Villalón’s own “mixed feelings” and
notes of caution from prominent Member State courts such as the
87. Hoffmeister, “Aktuelle Rechtsfragen in der Praxis der europäischen
Außenhandelspolitik”, 16 Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien (2013), 389.
88. Case C-53/96, Hermès, EU:C:1998:292.
89. Joined Cases C-300 & 392/98, Dior and Others, EU:C:2000:688.
90. Case C-431/05,Merck Genéricos.
91. Such landmark judgments would include Opinion 1/75, EU:C:1975:145 and Case
45/86, Commission v. Council (Generalized tariff preferences), EU:C:1987:163. See also
Ankersmit, op. cit. supra note 46, 206–207.
92. Daiichi Sankyo, para 55.
93. Opinion in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 49.
94. Art. 206 TFEU.
95. Art. 3(5) TEU.
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Bundesverfassungsgericht, which praised mixity as a model,96 it must be
stressed that it would be overreaching to interpret safeguards in the EU
Treaties on conferral,97 or “constitutional identity”,98 as meaning that the
Member States “were not really serious”, so to say, when they, as Masters of
the Treaties, explicitly expanded the scope of the CCP to include “the
commercial aspects of intellectual property”, and “foreign direct investment”
for that matter. The textual change in the EU Treaties that they effected was an
obvious and undeniable one, by which competence in this area has been
conferred on the Union, and which it may now exercise to the fullest extent.
For theBundesverfassungsgericht, this should not come as a surprise either.
In its 2009 Lisbon judgment, it anticipated that the post-Lisbon scope of the
CCP would entail a “shift of competences” by which the Member States
would not only lose “their competence for concluding international trade
agreements” (such as the Conditional Access Convention), but which could
result, down the line, in reducing “the status of the Member States’
membership in the World Trade Organization to a merely formal one”.99
The unequivocal language employed by the Court, grounded in post-Lisbon
Treaty terms, in stating that the TRIPs in its entirety fell under the CCP, and
that CCP alone represents the proper legal basis for the Conditional Access
Convention is a remarkable development. It certainly leads to more clarity and
simplicity in delimiting the competences and legal basis questions in this field,
finally leading the CCP out of its pre-Lisbon existence as a “policy of bits and
pieces”.100 It raises, however, more fundamental questions as to the future of
mixity and the international role of the Member States in international
economic governance.
4.2. Whither the Member States, whither mixity?
Based on the observation that both judgments judicially cement a wide
interpretation of the scope of the CCP following the Lisbon reform, we also
have to look further as to what this entails for the structure of the system of EU
96. Judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, para 376, using the English translation
provided by the German Court under: <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/EN/2009/06/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> (last visited 21 Feb. 2015), in
which it noted that ultimately the expanding external relations powers of the EU, fuelled by
Lisbon, “would also come into conflict with constitutional foundations”.
97. Art. 207(6) TFEU regarding the CCP; and generally Art. 5(2) TEU.
98. Art. 4(2) TEU.
99. Judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123., para 374.
100. Cremona, “A policy of bits and pieces? The Common Commercial Policy after Nice”,
4 CYELS (2001), 61–91.
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external relations, at any rate in the international economic sphere. This
system has traditionally been marked by what Hillion aptly termed the
“polyphonic nature of the Union’s external action”,101 and by what Dashwood
calls “bipolarity”.102 The former describes the fact that the EU and the
Member States act concurrently on the international stage, with none fully
eclipsing the other, while the latter describes the continuing schism between
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the other external
policies of the EU. While “bipolarity” has very much survived the “collapse of
the pillar structure”103 caused by Lisbon, the two judgments reviewed here
have to be seen as a curtailment of external relations “polyphony” in the EU’s
contributions to international economic governance.
The fact that the entirety of the TRIPs and GATS (with the exception of
transport services)104 has come to be covered by the CCP, and thus an
exclusive EU competence, results in “an increasing loss of visibility and
powers on the international plain for Member States”.105 However, it also
decreases the necessity for mixity as such, as now the whole TRIPs and the
vast majority of GATS have become so-called “false mixed agreements”.106
These are agreements to which both the Union and the Member States are
parties, but for which this is not really necessary, as the EU could easily have
concluded them on its own. In this vein, it is worth noting that Advocate
General Kokott summarized the Commission’s view in Commission v.
Council (Conditional Access Convention) as presuming that “the Council had
intended artificially to create a mixed agreement in order to allow the Member
States an international presence alongside the European Union.”107 Whether
this was really the Member States’ “intention” or a sincere attempt at
preserving “conferral” remains open to question, but what matters for legal
101. Hillion, “Mixity and coherence in EU External Relations: The significance of the
‘duty of cooperation’” in Hillion and Koutrakos (Eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU
and its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 87.
102. Dashwood, “The continuing bipolarity of EU external action” in Govaere et al. (Eds.),
The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Martinus Nijhoff,
2014), pp. 3–16.
103. Van Elsuwege, “EU external action after the collapse of the pillar structure. In search
of a new balance between delimitation and consistency”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 987–1019; see
also Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council.
104. Art. 207(5) TFEU.
105. Ankersmit, op. cit. supra note 46, 208.
106. Schermers, “Typology of mixed agreements” in O’Keeffe and Schermers (Eds.),
Mixed Agreements (Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1983), p. 27; Rosas, “Mixed Union — mixed
agreements” in Koskenniemi (Ed.), International LawAspects of the European Union (Kluwer
Law International, 1998), pp. 130–131.
107. Opinion in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 34
(emphasis added).
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purposes is that through its judgment the Court confirmed that the Convention
would indeed have been an “artificial” or “false” mixed agreement if the
Member States had been allowed as parties alongside the Union.
While from the point of view of international law, the Member States
continue to appear as fully-fledged parties to mixed international economic
agreements together with the EU, under EU law, as confirmed by this recent
case law, they move closer towards becoming a taciturn entourage of the
Union. This is what the Bundesverfassungsgericht called “a merely formal”
but no longer substantive membership in international organizations such as
the WTO.108 The less competence the Member States retain in areas within the
scope of activities of the WTO, the more their continued presence there must
then be justified as being relevant to their “constitutional identity” – as an
aspect that is “not open to integration”.109 This could be described as the
opposite of de Gaulle’s “empty chair” policy – a policy of holding on to a seat
at the table, while no longer being allowed to raise one’s hand to vote.
In this respect, a remarkable development can be observed within the
membership of the Conditional Access Convention. Regardless of whether
the Member States could or could not be forced out of international
organizations or agreements, some seem to leave voluntarily once the EU
arrives. At the time of the judgment in Commission v. Council (Conditional
Access Convention), seven Member States were already a party to the
Convention, with Finland having ratified it only five months before the ECJ’s
ruling. Since the judgment, three have already “thrown in the towel”, so to say.
In 2014, Bulgaria, Croatia and Cyprus denounced the Convention, leaving at
the time of writing only four EU Member States as parties.110 It cannot be said
with absolute certainty whether this was caused in all three cases by the
judgment, but the timing would suggest such an interpretation of events. If this
trend continues, the remaining Member States may also choose to give up the
policy of holding on to their seats and leave the Conditional Access
Convention, and possibly other international agreements over the subject
matter of which they have lost all power to act internationally. But this does not
mean a loss of power altogether. They simply retreat into the EU’s internal
space and exercise their – significant – decision-making powers in the Council
and bodies such as the Trade Committee.111
108. Judgment of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, cited supra note 96, para 374.
109. Ibid., para 239; note also para 375: “The Treaty of Lisbon may at any rate not force the
Member States to waive their member status.”
110. See the page on the status of the Conditional Access Convention of the website of the
Council of Europe Treaty Office, cited supra note 13.
111. Art. 207(3) TFEU; see on the Member States’ powers over the CCP within the Union,
Hahn and Danieli, “You’ll never walk alone: The European Union and its Member States in the
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As a matter of policy, and beyond the WTO context and the particular case
of the Conditional Access Convention, this new case law is of relevance for
the many trade agreements that the EU is currently negotiating, including
most prominently TTIP and CETA. As the debate on their “mixed” nature
continues within the EU, again pitting the Commission against the Member
States (and their parliaments),112 the two judgments do not resolve this
question. Given the width of coverage of such comprehensive agreements,
grey areas remain, while provisions on transport (services) and “political
dialogue” would continue to justify mixity.113
However, the present judgments certainly make such agreements “less
mixed”. In Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), this is
particularly true given that the Court seems to have accepted Advocate
General Kokott’s definition of “modern” international trade agreements as
providers “for the creation of uniform legal standards – if appropriate in the
form of minimum standards – for certain products, activities or sectors with a
view to facilitating cross-border trade.”114 Moreover, the Court considered in
the judgment that “criminal” or “law enforcement” measures concerning the
seizure and confiscation of illicit devices are part and parcel of the CCP given
that they serve the purpose of facilitating trade beyond the borders of the EU.
Even to the extent that such agreements will remain mixed, the Court has
confirmed that the scope of the Union’s competence was expanded
significantly by Lisbon vis-à-vis what it still “shares” with the Member States.
In this regard, it should be recalled that the Member States are not entirely free
to act as soon as they find themselves outside the Union’s exclusive
competence and within the sphere of shared competence. Here, they remain
constrained by the duty of sincere cooperation, which obliges them to
“facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure
which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives.”115 In mixed
agreements, this reflects the general Union interest to implement them in their
WTO” in Bungenberg and Herrmann (Eds.), Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon
(EuropeanYearbook of International Economic Law Special Issue, 2013), p. 51.
112. See e.g. European Commission, Letter from Vice-President Maroš Šefcˇovicˇ thanking
the 20 chambers that are signatories for their Opinion of 25 June 2014 on the role of national
Parliaments in concluding free trade agreements (FTAs), Brussels, 16.10.2014 C (2014)7557
final, available at: <ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/
slovenia/own_initiative/oi_role_of_national_parliaments_in_free_trade_agreements/oi_role_
of_national_parliaments_in_free_trade_agreements_assembly_reply_en.pdf> (last accessed
29 Nov. 2014).
113. Gstöhl and Hanf, op. cit. supra note 5, 379.
114. Opinion in Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 67.
115. Art. 4(3)(3) TEU.
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entirety, including areas of Member State competence.116 Hence, even if the
Member States stay clear of encroaching upon the expanded exclusive
competence that is the CCP as confirmed by the two Grand Chamber
judgments, whatever the Member States do in what remains of their shared
competence in mixed trade agreements, they will need to exercise it in a loyal
way.
4.3. From “single dissenting voice” to “sole organ”
Lastly, the widened post-Lisbon scope of the exclusive CCP leaves the
Commission in a stronger position as the Union’s external representative.
During the hearing for Daiichi Sankyo, the Portuguese representative called
the Commission “the single dissenting voice”.117 With this voice having
prevailed in both judgments, the Commission is confirmed as the “single
voice” of the European Union in international economic governance.
Consequently, instead of being one of the several voices making up the
EU’s external relations marked by mixity and “polyphony”, the Commission
as the Union’s negotiator and representative in the CCP becomes more
reminiscent of what in the United States is called the “sole organ” in foreign
relations. This term stems from a decision of the United States Supreme Court
from 1936, which stressed “that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations. …”118
According to the Court’s reasoning in both Daiichi Sankyo and
Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), we are not dealing
with the authority of the Commission to act internationally “by an exertion of
legislative power” in terms of “common rules” according to the ERTA
doctrine. Instead, these are considered cases of “a priori exclusivity”,119
lending “plenary and exclusive power” to the Commission as the sole
representative of the Union. When comparing the European Economic
116. Case C-13/00, Commission v. Ireland (Berne Convention), EU:C:2002:184.
117. As cited in the Opinion in Daiichi Sankyo, para 43.
118. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), p. 320.
119. Van Vooren and Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 101; and earlier Dashwood, “The relationship between
the Member States and the European Union/European Community”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 369.
Dashwood and Heliskoski, “The classic authorities revisited” in Dashwood and Hillion (Eds.),
The General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 16 use the term
“pre-emptive exclusivity”.
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Community to the U.S. in 1986, Eric Stein noted “there is no evidence that an
organ equipped with centralized diplomacy and other requisite
instrumentalities will emerge in the foreseeable future in Europe”.120 Today,
this observation must be qualified within the wide ambit of matters falling
under the post-Lisbon CCP, where the pre-existing practice of letting the
Commission represent the Member States has now been enshrined in the
Treaties and confirmed by the ECJ.
5. Conclusion
The combined effect of the judgments annotated represents a sea change in the
area of the CCP. Each fully endorsed the expanded boundaries of exclusive
Union competence based on the changes introduced by the Lisbon reform,
ending two decades of mixed feelings in the relations of the EU and its
Member States within the WTO and other trade-related areas following
Opinion 1/94.
For its part, Daiichi Sankyo placed the entirety of the TRIPs Agreement
under the CCP, thereby qualifying much of the case law regulating the
relationship between the EU and its Member States acting alongside each
other on the international stage. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access
Convention), moreover, confirms the CCP as the sole and correct legal basis
for concluding an agreement that in the past may have been deemed a matter
of harmonization within the internal market, as the Court embraced a modern,
widely defined notion of international trade. Taken together, these judgments
simplify the legal structure of EU external relations in the area of trade, albeit
at the expense of the Member States’ international presence – or at least scope
of action while retaining nominal international actorness – to the advantage of
the Commission as the “sole organ” speaking for the Union and defending
“the European Union’s global interests”121 in international economic
governance.
The two judgments certainly do not herald the complete phasing out of
mixed agreements any time soon. Beyond the CCP, mixity will doubtlessly
remain a viable and necessary modus operandi for the Union and its Member
States. However, following these rulings, and in view of the withdrawal of
Member States from “false mixed agreements” such as the Conditional
120. Stein, “Towards a European foreign policy? The European foreign affairs system from
the perspective of the United States constitution” in Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler (Eds.),
Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, Volume I, Book 3
(Walter de Gruyter, 1986), p. 82.
121. Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Convention), para 69.
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Access Convention, it may become the exception rather than the rule, at least
to the extent that the non-CCP part of EU external action has been noticeably
reduced.
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